# Will studying philosophy help strengthen Ti?



## Stawker (Nov 30, 2016)

Seq said:


> Firstly, why would Hume be bad for developing one's Ti?


Because his philosophy is what I call 'common sense'. It's a call away from complicated and contrived systems that dominated philosophy before him and towards a more observation-based philosophy.



> Secondly, why would reading Hume make one think that philosophy is a waste of time?


Doesn't really need an explanation/justification if you know that Hume's the guy who called metaphysics outright bullshit.


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## Seq (Aug 12, 2017)

Stawker said:


> Because his philosophy is what I call 'common sense'. It's a call away from complicated and contrived systems that dominated philosophy before him and towards a more observation-based philosophy.


The process of going where the observations take you invariably leads to a view that contradicts common sense. Any science will testify to this fact. 



> Doesn't really need an explanation/justification if you know that Hume's the guy who called metaphysics outright bullshit.


To reject metaphysics is not to reject philosophy. I take it that you accept this view, since you believe that Hume is conducting an 'observation-based philosophy'. Presumably, you don't believe that Hume is rejecting his own theory. Thus, reading Hume shouldn't make one think that _philosophy_ is a waste of time.


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## Stawker (Nov 30, 2016)

Seq said:


> The process of going where the observations take you invariably leads to a view that contradicts common sense. Any science will testify to this fact.


But the acceptance that we need to go where observations take us is indeed common sense.



> To reject metaphysics is not to reject philosophy. I take it that you accept this view, since you believe that Hume is conducting an 'observation-based philosophy'. Presumably, you don't believe that Hume is rejecting his own theory. Thus, reading Hume shouldn't make one think that _philosophy_ is a waste of time.


It's to reject most of philosophy. 

Hume's own philosophy is not metaphysics, not anymore. Unless you believe Daniel Dennet et al are also doing metaphysics.


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## gte (Mar 4, 2017)

Stawker said:


> Because his philosophy is what I call 'common sense'.


Isn't this another way of saying "because I like it"?

Based upon your comments so far, it seems to me that your agreement with Hume's philosophy boils down to subjective preferences.

Full disclosure: I don't read philosophy.


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## Seq (Aug 12, 2017)

Stawker said:


> But the acceptance that we need to go where observations take us is indeed common sense.


Perhaps. However, Hume's philosophy isn't just about accepting the idea, as you pointed out previously. It's about actually engaging in the process, which isn't common sense at all. Therefore, Hume's philosophy is not common sense. 



> It's to reject most of philosophy.


Your initial claim was that Hume rejected philosophy, such that reading him would make one think that reading philosophy is a waste of time. However, if it's merely the case that Hume rejected most of philosophy, then reading Hume is not liable to make one think that reading philosophy is a waste of time. Thus, your initial claim is false. 



> Hume's own philosophy is not metaphysics, not anymore. Unless you believe Daniel Dennet et al are also doing metaphysics.


Daniel Dennett is certainly not doing what Hume did. Dennett is doing metaphysics in every sense of the term. As far as I know, he subscribes to some kind of physicalism, which is a metaphysical position.


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## Stawker (Nov 30, 2016)

Seq said:


> Perhaps. However, Hume's philosophy isn't just about accepting the idea, as you pointed out previously. It's about actually engaging in the process, which isn't common sense at all. Therefore, Hume's philosophy is not common sense.


Playing with semantics here. I could just as well have said Hume's philosophy originates from a common sense acceptance. In my view though, everything beyond this acceptance should be common sense. Germ theory is common sense these days, so is gravity. In some other time, they weren't common sense. The difference between truth and common sense is simply of time. What is truth now will be common sense in a far future. 



> Your initial claim was that Hume rejected philosophy, such that reading him would make one think that reading philosophy is a waste of time. However, if it's merely the case that Hume rejected most of philosophy, then reading Hume is not liable to make one think that reading philosophy is a waste of time. Thus, your initial claim is false.


Most of Middle East, not all, is a dangerous place. I wonder why people avoid going there. (Hint: humans estimate, not deduce)



> Daniel Dennett is certainly not doing what Hume did. Dennett is doing metaphysics in every sense of the term. As far as I know, he subscribes to some kind of physicalism, which is a metaphysical position.


If Metaphysics concerns itself with everything which is beyond physics, and if I'm of the position that nothing is beyond physics, am I really doing metaphysics?

Considering Physicalism as an ontology amounts to reducing metaphysics to a tautology. I despite tautologies.



gte said:


> Isn't this another way of saying "because I like it"?
> 
> Based upon your comments so far, it seems to me that your agreement with Hume's philosophy boils down to subjective preferences.
> 
> Full disclosure: I don't read philosophy.



I didn't even get into the reasons for why I agree with Hume. Yet.


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## LetMeThinkAboutIt (Dec 15, 2017)

I think it depends on the type of philosophy. History of Philosophy and continental philosophy certainly helps with Ne, but may or may not help with Ti (it depends on the philosophers). Analytic Philosophy definitely helps with Ti.


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## Seq (Aug 12, 2017)

Stawker said:


> I could just as well have said Hume's philosophy originates from a common sense acceptance.


This claim would also have been incorrect. Evidence-based reasoning was far from common sense in the 18th century, so Hume's philosophy did not originate from common sense.



> Germ theory is common sense these days, so is gravity.


Actually, they're not. From the point of view of common sense, there is no reason why you should have to wash your hands prior to a surgery. That action only makes sense in the context of a complex theoretical model whereby microscopic and invisible entities litter your hands and cause disease unless removed. This is completely at odds with the point of view that we normally have on the world, where the things that exist are visible and familiar middle-sized objects. It's because humans have this (inherent) bias towards the readily visible that Semmelweis had such immense trouble convincing his colleagues of his theory (to the point where he went insane). To call it 'common sense' just because science and education today rivals 'the real' common sense inclination that humans develop by counteracting it early on is misguided. It's still a scientific theory, abstract and counterintuitive, and inherently difficult to act on the basis of. It's the same with all science. Take flying in an aircraft, for example. It's widely accepted that it's safe to fly in that way, but the process still defies common sense. Chances are that you'll still feel terrified doing it, on the grounds of that inherent bias alone. 

Contrary to popular belief, humans are not amorphous beings. They will always have a proclivity for certain theories rather than others because of how they are constituted. That constitution won't change. Thus, human 'common sense' will persist, and to rigorously and consistently back up what one is saying with data will never be a part of it. That will always be regarded as tedious and somehow unglamorous, much less preferable to an appeal to something like rhetoric and various related fallacies (for example). 



> Most of Middle East, not all, is a dangerous place. I wonder why people avoid going there. (Hint: humans estimate, not deduce)


Your initial claim was still that Hume's work would lead one to reject philosophy. This claim is still false, regardless of what one thinks of the completely different claim that Hume's philosophy will probably lead people to reject philosophy. The latter assertion may or may not be true, but if true, then people are misreading Hume and acting incoherently. After all, it makes no sense to reject philosophy due to a piece of philosophy. 



> If Metaphysics concerns itself with everything which is beyond physics, and if I'm of the position that nothing is beyond physics, am I really doing metaphysics?


As reluctant as Dennett and the like are to acknowledge it, of course you are. Think about it. Suppose we adopt some kind of Quinian physicalism that Dennett would be sympathetic towards, which (woefully unhelpfully) says that what exists are the kinds of entities that physicists talk about. Well, whatever you take this to entail, no data from physics justifies you drawing that conclusion, and sensible and non-dogmatic physicists who follow the evidence know this very well. Thus, it is for this reason that what Hume did is not what people like Dennett do. It follows that the two should not be conflated, along the lines I have said.


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## Seq (Aug 12, 2017)

LetMeThinkAboutIt said:


> I think it depends on the type of philosophy. History of Philosophy and continental philosophy certainly helps with Ne, but may or may not help with Ti (it depends on the philosophers). Analytic Philosophy definitely helps with Ti.


It's funny you say that. Two of my ENTP friends, with whom I regularly discuss philosophy, would strongly agree with you. I think my only reservation has to do with the history of philosophy. A lot of historical philosophy is every bit as rigorous as 'analytic' philosophy is (e.g. Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Locke, Berkeley, Aristotle, Kant, Plato, etc.), so it would make sense to say that it 'helps with Ti' as well.


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## LetMeThinkAboutIt (Dec 15, 2017)

Seq said:


> It's funny you say that. Two of my ENTP friends, with whom I regularly discuss philosophy, would strongly agree with you. I think my only reservation has to do with the history of philosophy. A lot of historical philosophy is every bit as rigorous as 'analytic' philosophy is (e.g. Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Locke, Berkeley, Aristotle, Kant, Plato, etc.), so it would make sense to say that it 'helps with Ti' as well.


I agree with you, this is why I said that it "may or may not help with Ti, depending on the philosopher" :tongue:


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## Seq (Aug 12, 2017)

LetMeThinkAboutIt said:


> I agree with you, this is why I said that it "may or may not help with Ti, depending on the philosopher" :tongue:


My mistake. Fair enough.


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## Stawker (Nov 30, 2016)

Seq said:


> This claim would also have been incorrect. Evidence-based reasoning was far from common sense in the 18th century, so Hume's philosophy did not originate from common sense.


It is now. And I exist now.



> Actually, they're not. From the point of view of common sense, there is no reason why you should have to wash your hands prior to a surgery. That action only makes sense in the context of a complex theoretical model whereby microscopic and invisible entities litter your hands and cause disease unless removed. This is completely at odds with the point of view that we normally have on the world, where the things that exist are visible and familiar middle-sized objects. It's because humans have this (inherent) bias towards the readily visible that Semmelweis had such immense trouble convincing his colleagues of his theory (to the point where he went insane). To call it 'common sense' just because science and education today rivals 'the real' common sense inclination that humans develop by counteracting it early on is misguided. It's still a scientific theory, abstract and counterintuitive, and inherently difficult to act on the basis of. It's the same with all science. Take flying in an aircraft, for example. It's widely accepted that it's safe to fly in that way, but the process still defies common sense. Chances are that you'll still feel terrified doing it, on the grounds of that inherent bias alone.
> 
> Contrary to popular belief, humans are not amorphous beings. They will always have a proclivity for certain theories rather than others because of how they are constituted. That constitution won't change. Thus, human 'common sense' will persist, and to rigorously and consistently back up what one is saying with data will never be a part of it. That will always be regarded as tedious and somehow unglamorous, much less preferable to an appeal to something like rhetoric and various related fallacies (for example).


If I ask a well-bred kid of today why he's washing his hands before eating, his reply would be 'germs!'. If I tell him not to wash his hands anymore, he'd demand an explanation. Deviating from the norm always demands an explanation. It doesn't matter if the kid doesn't understand the whole theory, what it means or entails, it is common knowledge now and therefore it is common sense. If that seems like a dubious definition of common sense then I will remind you that jumping from a height results in a fall was common sense since the beginning yet only now we have come to understand why or how it happens. No more Ti-overthinking required.

You're confusing common sense with cognitive biases. Common sense changes, as explained before. There used to be a time when it was common sense that a schizophrenic is actually possessed by demons. It's the bias for simple and social explanations that persist. 



> Your initial claim was still that Hume's work would lead one to reject philosophy. This claim is still false, regardless of what one thinks of the completely different claim that Hume's philosophy will probably lead people to reject philosophy. The latter assertion may or may not be true, but if true, then people are misreading Hume and acting incoherently. After all, it makes no sense to reject philosophy due to a piece of philosophy.


The term 'Philosophy' persists so long as we have different points of view. The day we come to agree on one, the term will disappear. Just as Natural Philosophy was ultimately subsumed by 'Science'. In that sense, it is entirely possible to reject philosophy because of a piece of philosophy if the latter rejects the former and if you are convinced of its veracity. 

As for the claim of 'most' and 'all', it was a rough statement. Personally, I was quick to discard philosophy after Hume. Hume is enough to discourage one from reading philosophy. And that fact is enough for me to advise anyone who should be reading philosophy not to read Hume. 



> As reluctant as Dennett and the like are to acknowledge it, of course you are. Think about it. Suppose we adopt some kind of Quinian physicalism that Dennett would be sympathetic towards, which (woefully unhelpfully) says that what exists are the kinds of entities that physicists talk about. Well, whatever you take this to entail, no data from physics justifies you drawing that conclusion, and sensible and non-dogmatic physicists who follow the evidence know this very well. Thus, it is for this reason that what Hume did is not what people like Dennett do. It follows that the two should not be conflated, along the lines I have said.


I prefer to stay away from all-encompassing general terms. If there can be such a thing that does not fall under Metaphysics one way or another, then I'm willing to discuss this matter. If not, I know very well where this rabbit hole leads to.


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## Seq (Aug 12, 2017)

Stawker said:


> It is now. And I exist now.


This response makes no sense under your favoured conception of common sense. Thus, suppose we accept your view that it is a kind of norm that is completely malleable over time. In that case, you obviously accept that following the evidence, and so Hume's philosophy, was not common sense in the 18th century (either abiding by it or simply accepting it). After all, that was not part of the norm at the time, in either sense. Now consider the following statement of yours:



> I could just as well have said Hume's philosophy originates from a common sense acceptance.


This statement is unequivocally false on your own view. The common sense back in the 18th century did not involve either accepting, or abiding by, the evidence. In fact, the only way to make sense of the above statement is to accept a kind of inverted version of my own view, which says that the scientific method was _always_ common sense, irrespective of what the surrounding norms say. This view is consistent with the above claim, but inconsistent with your view that common sense is a malleable thing that changes over time (i.e. the quoted claim at the top of this post). Thus, your claims make no sense collectively. 



> If I ask a well-bred kid of today why he's washing his hands before eating, his reply would be 'germs!'. If I tell him not to wash his hands anymore, he'd demand an explanation. Deviating from the norm always demands an explanation.


The demand for an explanation is no mark of common sense. We can, and do, demand explanations for claims which are definitely not part of common sense under any feasible interpretation of that phrase. For example, one might ask for an explanation why one should accept string theory (which, being a _controversial_ scientific theory, does not fit even your criteria for common sense). 



> If that seems like a dubious definition of common sense then I will remind you that jumping from a height results in a fall was common sense since the beginning yet only now we have come to understand why or how it happens.


I don't understand what your point is here. I'm afraid you're going to have to elaborate. 



> You're confusing common sense with cognitive biases.


No, I am not. Human biases form the basis for common sense. Evidence-based reasoning does not, and never has. If evidence-based reasoning, as opposed to biases, had somehow formed the basis for common sense, then it becomes impossible to explain how things like schizophrenia was commonly regarded as people being possessed by demons. Obviously, no evidence substantiates that view. The only thing that can explain that observation, therefore, is the idea that common sense ultimately emerges from biases and not from evidence.

As for the fact that common sense changes, that's not to say that it doesn't stem from biases. One and the same bias can give rise to multiple conclusions (and so multiple common sense theories). For example, suppose that humans have a bias to be afraid of flying. This might lead one to conclude that some Sun God doesn't want you to be up there, or it might lead you to think that some Earth God doesn't want you to. The data generates an infinite number of possible theories, which are all incompatible with one another.



> The term 'Philosophy' persists so long as we have different points of view. The day we come to agree on one, the term will disappear. Just as Natural Philosophy was ultimately subsumed by 'Science'. In that sense, it is entirely possible to reject philosophy because of a piece of philosophy if the latter rejects the former and if you are convinced of its veracity.


This doesn't make sense. If a philosophical thesis A rejects the entire set of philosophical theses, then it rejects itself. The only way in which it could not do so is if philosophical thesis A is not a philosophical thesis, but this is obviously contradictory.



> As for the claim of 'most' and 'all', it was a rough statement. Personally, I was quick to discard philosophy after Hume. Hume is enough to discourage one from reading philosophy. And that fact is enough for me to advise anyone who should be reading philosophy not to read Hume.


This doesn't make sense either. The last sentence implies that you think that people should read philosophy. Yet the second-to-last sentence states that you stopped reading philosophy because of Hume, which implies that you think that people (including yourself) should not read philosophy. This contradiction holds, unless you think that Hume's arguments against philosophy (whatever those may be; on your view they must exist) only apply to you and nobody else. That's bizarre, and I take it that you don't believe this. 



> I prefer to stay away from all-encompassing general terms. If there can be such a thing that does not fall under Metaphysics one way or another, then I'm willing to discuss this matter. If not, I know very well where this rabbit hole leads to.


There are things that don't fall under Dennett and others' metaphysics. It's called science.


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## calicobts (Sep 12, 2017)

It exercises Ti and Ni, but you'll have to do it the right way for Ti to be exercised properly.


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## Stawker (Nov 30, 2016)

Seq said:


> This response makes no sense under your favoured conception of common sense. Thus, suppose we accept your view that it is a kind of norm that is completely malleable over time. In that case, you obviously accept that following the evidence, and so Hume's philosophy, was not common sense in the 18th century (either abiding by it or simply accepting it). After all, that was not part of the norm at the time, in either sense. Now consider the following statement of yours:
> 
> 
> 
> This statement is unequivocally false on your own view. The common sense back in the 18th century did not involve either accepting, or abiding by, the evidence. In fact, the only way to make sense of the above statement is to accept a kind of inverted version of my own view, which says that the scientific method was _always_ common sense, irrespective of what the surrounding norms say. This view is consistent with the above claim, but inconsistent with your view that common sense is a malleable thing that changes over time (i.e. the quoted claim at the top of this post). Thus, your claims make no sense collectively.


Remind me of the one time I said Hume's philosophy was/originates from _common sense according to his time_. I distinctly remember my original statement:_ Hume's philosophy is what I call 'common sense'.

_



> The demand for an explanation is no mark of common sense. We can, and do, demand explanations for claims which are definitely not part of common sense under any feasible interpretation of that phrase. For example, one might ask for an explanation why one should accept string theory (which, being a _controversial_ scientific theory, does not fit even your criteria for common sense).


We demand explanations for things that are _not _common sense, is what I said. And before you say we can demand explanation for germ theory, yes we do. My statement is about habits, not logic. I'm not saying that once a thing becomes common sense it ceases to have explanations. We just simply stop demanding it, mostly. 



> I don't understand what your point is here. I'm afraid you're going to have to elaborate.


I was elaborating my previous point that you misconstrued. Things that we don't have any explanation for can be common sense and so do things for which we have an explanation. Common sense is more of an attitude we have towards something -- namely that we don't usually think it stands in need of explanation -- than it is about the thing itself. It naturally follows that whatever can be easily and clearly transmitted to the lowest layman of society will end up becoming common sense. The Heliocentric model of solar system is common sense now, although it may not be properly understood by most people. It's that simple.



> No, I am not. Human biases form the basis for common sense. Evidence-based reasoning does not, and never has. If evidence-based reasoning, as opposed to biases, had somehow formed the basis for common sense, then it becomes impossible to explain how things like schizophrenia was commonly regarded as people being possessed by demons. Obviously, no evidence substantiates that view. The only thing that can explain that observation, therefore, is the idea that common sense ultimately emerges from biases and not from evidence.
> 
> As for the fact that common sense changes, that's not to say that it doesn't stem from biases. One and the same bias can give rise to multiple conclusions (and so multiple common sense theories). For example, suppose that humans have a bias to be afraid of flying. This might lead one to conclude that some Sun God doesn't want you to be up there, or it might lead you to think that some Earth God doesn't want you to. The data generates an infinite number of possible theories, which are all incompatible with one another.


I reminded you that my statement was never about common sense in the past. Acceptance of evidence-based reasoning is common sense now, not before. As for the basis for common sense itself, I only once alluded to it in my earlier posts that whatever is true (or thought to be true) now will at some point in future be common sense. With this statement, I have confessed the immutability of truth itself (truth --> common sense --> refutation --> truth), which is how you would expect truth to be in a Universe where science is the only way of acquiring positive knowledge. 



> This doesn't make sense. If a philosophical thesis A rejects the entire set of philosophical theses, then it rejects itself. The only way in which it could not do so is if philosophical thesis A is not a philosophical thesis, but this is obviously contradictory.


Can a scientific theory reject the ones before it? By your logic, it cannot. Remember that philosophy is a general label. What is inside it is free to reject or affirm everything around it. It does not negate the label itself unless there's only one thing left in the box.



> This doesn't make sense either. The last sentence implies that you think that people should read philosophy. Yet the second-to-last sentence states that you stopped reading philosophy because of Hume, which implies that you think that people (including yourself) should not read philosophy. This contradiction holds, unless you think that Hume's arguments against philosophy (whatever those may be; on your view they must exist) only apply to you and nobody else. That's bizarre, and I take it that you don't believe this.


I suggest you stop looking for 'implications' in my words because I only say what I mean. The last sentence implies that I tell people whatever helps them achieve their goal. It's not my concern whether people should or should not read philosophy. I have a guy before me who wants to read it and he's asking my advice, so I'm making sure not to disclose something which might discourage him. If you expect me to sermonize him into my own preferences, I'd rather not. I'll wait for him to come around. 



> There are things that don't fall under Dennett and others' metaphysics. It's called science.


Science follows a Materialist mode of thought. Not sure how it has suddenly stopped being ontological.


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## Seq (Aug 12, 2017)

> Remind me of the one time I said Hume's philosophy was/originates from common sense _according to his time_.


I took you to be saying this when you said the following:



> I could just as well have said Hume's philosophy originates from a common sense acceptance.


If the above does not express the idea that Hume's philosophy originated from the common sense of his time, then you must be saying that Hume's philosophy originated from the common sense of some other time than his own. Being charitable, I took you to not be saying this. After all, how could anyone possibly think that a philosophy originated from the common sense of a _future time_? At the time that Hume was writing, the common sense of our time, which is the only time that you could be speaking of other than his time, obviously did not exist. Thus, it clearly could not have been the originator of Hume's philosophy.

You definitely were saying that Hume's philosophy originated from the common sense of his time. You could not have meant anything else. Therefore, your conception of common sense is inconsistent along the lines I have explained. You have used the phrase to refer to something that is both variant and invariant across time.



> I distinctly remember my original statement: Hume's philosophy is what I call 'common sense'.


Strictly speaking, what you said was the following:



> Because his philosophy is what I call 'common sense'. It's a call away from complicated and contrived systems that dominated philosophy before him and towards a more observation-based philosophy.


As I have repeatedly explained, following the evidence (observations) is contrary to common sense. This can be readily observed by anyone who cares to follow the evidence with respect to something like physical space, biology, chemistry, psychology, etc. . An obvious example that stands out given what has been said is the common sense view of time, versus the account of time given by our best physical theories. Our common sense view of time, which virtually everyone in the Western world uses, conceives of time as having a past, present and a future. Furthermore, out of these categories, only the present exists. In physics, these categories don't exist. Time is a constant, and no parts of this constant do not exist. As you can see therefore, blindingly obviously, following the evidence does not yield common sense. It yields extremely strange things that we are literally not equipped to express and incorporate into natural language, or even conceive of in the usual ways (other than metaphorically). 

Either way, the flaws of the above statement go beyond this initial confusion. After all, the complicated and contrived systems that used to dominate philosophy before Hume are far less contrived and complicated than countless contemporary scientific theories are. Thus, if your criterion for developing Ti is to engage with such systems (which it is), then it follows that one should follow the observations. Yet following the observations is precisely what you have branded 'common sense', and so not apt for the development of Ti. This is, once again, inconsistent.



> We demand explanations for things that are not common sense, is what I said. And before you say we can demand explanation for germ theory, yes we do. My statement is about habits, not logic. I'm not saying that once a thing becomes common sense it ceases to have explanations. We just simply stop demanding it, mostly.
> 
> I was elaborating my previous point that you misconstrued. Things that we don't have any explanation for can be common sense and so do things for which we have an explanation. Common sense is more of an attitude we have towards something -- namely that we don't usually think it stands in need of explanation -- than it is about the thing itself. It naturally follows that whatever can be easily and clearly transmitted to the lowest layman of society will end up becoming common sense.


So, we demand explanations for things that are not common sense, and we demand explanations for things which are common sense. However, most of the time, we don't demand it for common sense. I don't see how explanation is even relevant to the discussion, as far as these assertions go.

Furthermore, it follows from what you've said in the above that effectively no contemporary scientific theory ever could be common sense. After all, what is passed down to 'laymen' are not the actual scientific theories. They're literally just metaphors for those theories, and have no real explanatory power of their own. This all but concedes the point that following the evidence, as one does in science, is contrary rather than congenial to common sense.



> With this statement, I have confessed the immutability of truth itself (truth --> common sense --> refutation --> truth), which is how you would expect truth to be in a Universe where science is the only way of acquiring positive knowledge.


I have never come across a scientific theory that invokes the concept of truth in order to explain some phenomenon. Thus, I have no idea why you mention it in the context of science.



> Can a scientific theory reject the ones before it? By your logic, it cannot.


This is false. 'My logic' has made no claims about the ability of either scientific or philosophical theories to reject the theories which came before them. That's obviously fine, since it doesn't reject every theory in the set of philosophical theories and the set of scientific theories. What I have said, which is true, is that you cannot coherently use philosophy to reject philosophy, just like you cannot use science to reject science. Remember, this just means that a scientific or philosophical theory, contained either in the set of scientific theories or philosophical theories, cannot consistently reject all the theories contained within that set. That is self-refuting, and obviously so. Thus, your idea that one can use Hume to reject philosophy is false. If you didn't know that, that's too bad. Now you know. 



> It's not my concern whether people should or should not read philosophy. I have a guy before me who wants to read it and he's asking my advice, so I'm making sure not to disclose something which might discourage him. If you expect me to sermonize him into my own preferences, I'd rather not. I'll wait for him to come around.


All I have to say about this is what I what I said before. That is, reading Hume yields no arguments that would make one reject philosophy, since there are no coherent philosophical arguments that reject philosophy. Thus, since the basis for your assessment won't take into consideration anything other than Hume's arguments, your assessment could not yield a conclusion that reading Hume might discourage people from reading philosophy. That would only be possible if you based your assessment upon something other than the arguments, which would be an uncharitable thing to do. Therefore, limiting yourself to Hume's arguments, you have no reason to think that Hume's philosophy might discourage people from the discipline.



> Science follows a Materialist mode of thought. Not sure how it has suddenly stopped being ontological.


It literally doesn't. The word 'materialism' has not had an explanatory use in science since 17th century Cartesian physics. Modern physics, which begins with Newtonianism, was labelled _anti_-materialist back then, because it invoked action at a distance (which was impossible in Descartes' system). This was contrasted with Descartes' 'principle of direct contact', which said that something is material just in case it directly touches something else.

Since then, philosophical nomenclature has completely lost application in scientific contexts. Philosophers like Quine, who is the originator of the materialist conception of science that you're presupposing here (also used by Dennett, who was a student of Quine), literally just said that 'physical things' are the sorts of things that physicists talk about. This constituted a serious break from how this term had been used in the past, if 'physical' and 'material' are to be equated with one another. Quine's use stands outside of a scientific context and is wholly useless for investigation. Descartes' use, on the other hand (as with Newton's anti-materialism) occupied a perfectly serious place in science. 

I could give you a reading list on this if you're actually interested.


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## Stawker (Nov 30, 2016)

Seq said:


> I took you to be saying this when you said the following:
> 
> If the above does not express the idea that Hume's philosophy originated from the common sense of his time, then you must be saying that Hume's philosophy originated from the common sense of some other time than his own. Being charitable, I took you to not be saying this. After all, how could anyone possibly think that a philosophy originated from the common sense of a _future time_? At the time that Hume was writing, the common sense of our time, which is the only time that you could be speaking of other than his time, obviously did not exist. Thus, it clearly could not have been the originator of Hume's philosophy.
> 
> You definitely were saying that Hume's philosophy originated from the common sense of his time. You could not have meant anything else. Therefore, your conception of common sense is inconsistent along the lines I have explained. You have used the phrase to refer to something that is both variant and invariant across time.


This is the last time I'll address this part of our discussion as it is the 5th time you've consecutively strawmanned me. I have no patience for people who are clearly looking to waste my time or who can't read properly. 

I said Hume's philosophy begins from a common sense perspective. You then argued that his philosophy leads to anything but common sense. To that I clarified that no matter the complexities of his direction, it's the direction itself that I call common sense. And I call it common sense because it is common sense in my time, not in his. Any 21st century reader of Hume would feel like he's on the same page with Hume more so than other philosophers precisely because Hume, so far back in time, had a perspective which would later become common. 

I've simplified it to bare bones now. I no longer need to tolerate bullshit sophistry after this. You've had enough benefit of doubt by now.



> As I have repeatedly explained, following the evidence (observations) is contrary to common sense. This can be readily observed by anyone who cares to follow the evidence with respect to something like physical space, biology, chemistry, psychology, etc. . An obvious example that stands out given what has been said is the common sense view of time, versus the account of time given by our best physical theories. Our common sense view of time, which virtually everyone in the Western world uses, conceives of time as having a past, present and a future. Furthermore, out of these categories, only the present exists. In physics, these categories don't exist. Time is a constant, and no parts of this constant do not exist. As you can see therefore, blindingly obviously, following the evidence does not yield common sense. It yields extremely strange things that we are literally not equipped to express and incorporate into natural language, or even conceive of in the usual ways (other than metaphorically).


Newton's Theory of Gravitation, at its own time, was another one of ideas people could not accept so easily. Yet today, when it's been taught in high schools for centuries, it is common sense. Although the General Theory of Relativity is closer to reality, the fact that it is still inaccessible at lower levels, and hence generally inaccessible, means it's a long shot from becoming common knowledge a.k.a common sense. But it will. Just like all complex but true theories of 500 or so years ago are common sense nowadays. It doesn't matter what common sense is nowadays or how far from it is the more accurate thing, if it is accurate, it will eventually make its way into normalcy. If you can't accept this, you're basically admitting that 500 years down the road, people would still be as astonished with General Theory of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics as we are nowadays. And that's just ridiculous.



> Either way, the flaws of the above statement go beyond this initial confusion. After all, the complicated and contrived systems that used to dominate philosophy before Hume are far less contrived and complicated than countless contemporary scientific theories are. Thus, if your criterion for developing Ti is to engage with such systems (which it is), then it follows that one should follow the observations. Yet following the observations is precisely what you have branded 'common sense', and so not apt for the development of Ti. This is, once again, inconsistent.


Contemporary Scientific theories employ inductive, not deductive, reasoning. Ti operates on deductions. 



> So, we demand explanations for things that are not common sense, and we demand explanations for things which are common sense. However, most of the time, we don't demand it for common sense. I don't see how explanation is even relevant to the discussion, as far as these assertions go.


You said that the demand for explanations is no mark of common sense. It turns out it is. Unless you're still going to employ your impossible criteria of everything being 100% or 0%. Count me the number of instances people asked you why you were washing your hands. 

You know, this is one of the reasons I hate philosophy: It gets people so far out of touch with reality, they become incapable of thinking in anything but absolutes and almost certainly fail to be good observers. 



> Furthermore, it follows from what you've said in the above that effectively no contemporary scientific theory ever could be common sense. After all, what is passed down to 'laymen' are not the actual scientific theories. They're literally just metaphors for those theories, and have no real explanatory power of their own. This all but concedes the point that following the evidence, as one does in science, is contrary rather than congenial to common sense.


Again, you're employing a stupid criteria for common sense in which only those things are common sense that are completely understood. If you can accept that if I drop this laptop from a height it will fall is common sense, then you will be contradicting yourself since I don't know the complete physics behind why it happens. Or are only scientists capable of common sense?

It's the conclusions of those theories, the biggest arguments, that develop into common sense. And that's all the general populace should know.



> I have never come across a scientific theory that invokes the concept of truth in order to explain some phenomenon. Thus, I have no idea why you mention it in the context of science.


And I have never seen how truth can be irrelevant in any discussion whatsoever.



> This is false. 'My logic' has made no claims about the ability of either scientific or philosophical theories to reject the theories which came before them. That's obviously fine, since it doesn't reject every theory in the set of philosophical theories and the set of scientific theories. What I have said, which is true, is that you cannot coherently use philosophy to reject philosophy, just like you cannot use science to reject science. Remember, this just means that a scientific or philosophical theory, contained either in the set of scientific theories or philosophical theories, cannot consistently reject all the theories contained within that set. That is self-refuting, and obviously so. Thus, your idea that one can use Hume to reject philosophy is false. If you didn't know that, that's too bad. Now you know.


Science rejecting science sounds like a contradiction. Philosophy rejecting philosophy sounds like a contradiction too. But how about we give these labels a name?

General Theory of Relativity rejects Newtonian theory of Gravitation.
Materialism rejects Idealism. 

How did that even happen? I leave it to you to ponder. 



> All I have to say about this is what I what I said before. That is, reading Hume yields no arguments that would make one reject philosophy, since there are no coherent philosophical arguments that reject philosophy. Thus, since the basis for your assessment won't take into consideration anything other than Hume's arguments, your assessment could not yield a conclusion that reading Hume might discourage people from reading philosophy. That would only be possible if you based your assessment upon something other than the arguments, which would be an uncharitable thing to do. Therefore, limiting yourself to Hume's arguments, you have no reason to think that Hume's philosophy might discourage people from the discipline.


Think again.


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## TheDarknessInTheSnow (May 28, 2016)

Perhaps. But a large part of philosophy can be very Fi as well.


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## Zeus (Oct 8, 2011)

Probably not so anymore than hallunogenic drugs do.


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## gte (Mar 4, 2017)

@Seq the way I see it @Stawker seems to have relatively limited exposure to philosophy and neither of you is actually trying to understand your opponent. You are going in depth (way too much as I see it) and he's simply brushing it off by expanding the scope of the discussion.


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