# Game Theory People?



## XP12asdf (Jul 13, 2014)

Anyone on here have an interest in game theory? Whether it be from traditional games, economic, biology, or whatever. I study GTO play because I a play pokerz and my bread and butter game(when I can get action from someone who isn't bumhunting) is Heads Up(1v1) NLHE, even if I generally prefer to play a mix of GTO an exploitative strategies due to the fact that GTO really isn't GTO against basically everyone. 

So basically I just want to start this thread to see if anyone else likes game theory and we can all discuss topics and bounce ideas/math off of one another for whatever we use it for.


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## noz (Dec 7, 2009)

I like game theory but I try to apply it to the real world, incorporating personality/temperament theory along with it, rather than those pointless 4 plot outcome brackets the theorists talk about. For instance, when an ESTP and an INTP both start a new job, they perceive the "Game" that is the workplace very differently. I think it's one of the greatest misunderstandings in the workplace, that is, people perceiving different social games going on in the same place. 

Also, think of game theory as applied to the dating world. Everyone in the dating world is playing a different game with different goals, using different chess pieces, leading to mass confusion and misunderstandings, and of course hurt feelings.


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## XP12asdf (Jul 13, 2014)

@noz

Lol the importance of application is def what separates you as an ENTP from me as an INTP. 

But so you say that you try to apply it to the world in thinks like the work place or relationships... how? Do you just recognize that game theory has a place in spots like these. Or have you worked on models or anything to try and figure out something from these observations?


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## noz (Dec 7, 2009)

Nah nothing that sophisticated as models.... I just try to realize the SJs are playing one type of game (ladder heirarchy), SPs another (make friends), the NTs are there just trying to figure shit out, etc.


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## ToplessOrange (Jun 3, 2013)

noz said:


> Nah nothing that sophisticated as models.... I just try to realize the SJs are playing one type of game (ladder heirarchy), SPs another (make friends), the NTs are there just trying to figure shit out, etc.


Why would you put etc. with one more Temperament to go!? WHY!? WHY WOULD YOU LEAVE US HANGING LIKE THAT!? You cruel monster. I'd do something about it, but I don't have an incentive.

Game theory is one of those subjects that are more interesting and rewarding in real life than in Hollywood. Very rare. I am sad to say I'm more of an astrophysics guy, and sometimes quantum physics, so I'm pretty much set in terms of abstract cerbral subject. Emotionally cathartic subject is covered by Theatre. So, I don't dip into Game Theory TOO often, but I do when it's there in front of me.

Like an acquintance. You don't call your acquaintances to hang out with them, but you don't oppose it, so if they're there, you totally do.


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## Tezcatlipoca (Jun 6, 2014)

Yes, I am interested in the applications it has for evolution of altruism in social networks.

Penn biologists show that generosity leads to evolutionary success


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## RobynC (Jun 10, 2011)

@Tezcatlipoca

The problem is that for a small number, amorality and exploitative conduct benefits them. It's important to being able to identify thse people


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## gestalt (Feb 15, 2011)

Tezcatlipoca said:


> Yes, I am interested in the applications it has for evolution of altruism in social networks.
> 
> Penn biologists show that generosity leads to evolutionary success



They will lie to us all day, though, and tell you that pure selfishness is the only way to go.

Dont believe them for a minute. Co operation > competition in every possible way.


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## Tezcatlipoca (Jun 6, 2014)

RobynC said:


> @Tezcatlipoca
> 
> The problem is that for a small number, amorality and exploitative conduct benefits them. It's important to being able to identify thse people


I am no longer going to respond to you, because it is clear you do not even examine the information presented before making your judgements. I believe people like you are dangerous. If you should change your mind then I will be amenable to reconciliation.


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## RobynC (Jun 10, 2011)

I read the article, and I understand the points mentioned: Society would disintegrate if it was a truly dog-eat-dog world with everybody out to get everybody else. In fact, it would never have formed.

Long term success of societies (particularly ones worth living in) is dependent on altruistic behavior.

However, I have read extensively about psychopaths and people of that nature: I can attest to the fact that for a small number, being amoral (while appearing not to be) is actually beneficial for those small few. They've effectively found a niche in society.

If there numbers got excessively large, they would begin to undermine the cohesion of a society for the reasons you specified above.


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## Andromeda31 (Jul 21, 2014)

I've been interested in the economic problems of a post-scarce world where production is no longer bound by property rights and large amounts of capital. How would these natural resources be shared between countries/provinces, and what systems would be put in place to ensure a functioning economy? This also raises questions about personal freedom, property rights, and ideology.


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## Tezcatlipoca (Jun 6, 2014)

@RobynC

The idea is that cooperative networks will outcompete members who are solely benefitting themselves in time because the members who behave purely in their own interests will damage genetically related members for their own advantage which is a load that ideal cooperative networks don't have to deal with. Obviously there are no ideal cooperative networks, but the success and utility of this behavior can be seen in the evolution of ant mega colonies for example. 

The evolution of altruism: selflessness in ants? That's fighting talk - Telegraph

By the way, I recommend shakespeare's sonnets when you feel anxiety about the future/technology


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## John Coltrane (May 11, 2013)

st4rbrst said:


> Anyone on here have an interest in game theory? Whether it be from traditional games, economic, biology, or whatever. I study GTO play because I a play pokerz and my bread and butter game(when I can get action from someone who isn't bumhunting) is Heads Up(1v1) NLHE, even if I generally prefer to play a mix of GTO an exploitative strategies due to the fact that GTO really isn't GTO against basically everyone.
> 
> So basically I just want to start this thread to see if anyone else likes game theory and we can all discuss topics and bounce ideas/math off of one another for whatever we use it for.


Game theory is insanely interesting. I got into it from reading about it as applied to evolutionary biology, then read about it's applications to economics & politics. Recently rented a book from a library called 'Fun & Games' (can't remember the author's name) which was enjoyable and challenging. Each chapter began with a sequential illustration from Alice in Wonderland to explain concepts in game theory. I believe it has been revised a few times. John Nash is famous for making innovations in the area, his doctorate paper describes equilibrium points as applied to a poker game, though I haven't read it in full. Which particular area are you interested in?


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## RobynC (Jun 10, 2011)

Tezcatlipoca said:


> Obviously there are no ideal cooperative networks, but the success and utility of this behavior can be seen in the evolution of ant mega colonies for example.


The logical conclusion of that is the Borg


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## Tezcatlipoca (Jun 6, 2014)

Not imo. I believe intelligences will become networked, but eventually that will give way to macro intelligence, that evolves from causal entropic forces. I think it will be quite beautiful, harmonious, calm, and wondrous actually. We are all dying. "The world and its desires pass away". What matters is how we pass away, what we give way to, and whether the shape of things to come is beautiful or ugly. Even if we live 1 billion years, then we will evolve to other beings we could not recognize. If there be gods then we shall move into rapture in God's own time or reincarnate till we reach enlightenment. Whatever the case may be let go of your anger for your time is short and you only disrupt the orderly movement of your own mind.


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## XP12asdf (Jul 13, 2014)

John Coltrane said:


> Which particular area are you interested in?



Wayyyyyyy tl;dr, but I get excited about this stuff 

Well currently I play a lot of 6-max poker (shorthanded/whatever. I hate fullring(9/10 players)). So GTO play there is kind of limited to semi balancing your ranges for common river spots. Nash equilibriums in 3+ player games is fairly useless as in HU playing perfect nash equilibrium strats would guarantee that you at least broke even in the long run, but in 3+ player games it would not necessarily yield the same results.)

I really love Heads up (1v1) poker since you can play more hands and you can find and exploit your edges quicker and more effectively. GTO study is also super practical and far more appropriate in games like these and can be applied much more (2 player, zero sum game = there is a Nash Equilibrium in there somewhere). Unfortunately, the state of HU poker these days is shit as most players just sit and wait for a 6max or full ring player to sit down and not know what they're doing (You play wayyyy less hands in 6max and especially full ring so you don't really know how to deal with marginal spots as well as a HU player). So getting action as a good HU player is pretty hard and you have to sit for long periods of time in order to play a session, so I just fill a lot of time 8 tabling 6max until I can get action HU. 

But anyways, as for what I use game theory for in poker. 1st, look up what a Nash Equilibrium is if you don't know, could write a whole post on what that is. However I'll explain a very simple river scenario and how one would use game theory to find a solution. 

There's a situation in poker called polar vs bluff catcher, PvBC. This is when one player's range (hands he gets to this spot with) is either a bluff catcher, or mediocre hand that only beats the polar players bluffs. The polar player however holds 2 different types of hands in his range, strong hands that beat all of the bluff catching player's range and bluffs, which always lose when called. Now, in a river situation like this, it makes sense that the polar player always go all in for his river bet. This is because the polar players value hands always win and so shoving allows him to include the highest percentage of bluffs in his betting range (The bigger the bet compared to the pot, the more often the BC player has to be right when he calls in order to make his call profitable). 

So let's do a basic example. In this river spot there is $50 in the pot. Each player has $100 left behind. We will call the polar player P(P) and the bluff catching player P(BC). We will say that the P(P) gets to this spot with his range comprised of 30% value hands and 70% air(hands that never win at showdown). P(P) will also bet $100 with his entire betting range, for reasons we have already established. At equilibrium (the nash equilibrium for this particular spot), the bc player will be calling with a frequency based on pot odds. This frequency is (Pot/(Pot+Bet)). In this case this is (150/250), or 60 percent of the time. This is only applicable if the polar player is including enough bluffs in his betting range that P(BC) is indifferent to calling the shove with the 60% of his range that calls. The frequency that the P(P) bluffs with is (Bet/(Bet+Pot)). In this case this is (100/250) or 40%. This 40% is not 40% of his entire range however, but 40% of his value range, or 40% of 30%, so 12%, or a total of 42% of his entire rane. So this comes down to the P(P) betting his entire value range, and then another 12% of his air (which turns out to be around 17% of his air) and he gives up with the rest. This may seem odd to someone as these hands always lose when they check, but if P(P) bet with all of these hands then P(BC) could happily call with all of hands and expect to do better, on average, than if he folded any one of these hands. In fact, if P(P) bets 13% of his range for a total 43% of his entire range, P(BC) can actually call with all of his hands and expect to profit more than if he folded (on average). Of course P(P) would then eliminate all bluffs as they would do better by checking and losing than always being called. This would cause P(BC) to never call as these hands do better by folding than calling and always facing a hand that beats them. This cycles back and forth endlessly with varying frequencies until each player reaches the equilibrium frequencies stated. At these frequencies is exploiting his opponent maximally (odd concept that each player is being exploited the max amount by each other, but it's true). Because of this neither opponent has an incentive to change his strategy. If these two players played this same exact spot over and over with the defined ranges they have here and followed these frequencies over time they would break even with each other, neglecting rake. 

This is an extremely simple example, and is one that is usually used as an introduction to those learning about GTO play as the game is much more complicated, as if the BC player holds some slow plays in his range, even a relatively small amount (say about 10% of his entire range) then P(P)'s most profitable strategy is no longer to always shove, unless stacks are sufficiently short, and the threat of bluff raises against the polar player make GTO play much more difficult. Interestingly, if the P(BC) who also has slow plays only raises slow plays and doesn't bluff raise, P(P) should still not go in but he can bluff with a higher frequency than if P(BC) bluff raises. This is because if P(BC) only value raises then P(P) can just fold as the raise from P(BC) is actually no more than a call to P(P), since he will lose the same amount vs a raise he never calls as if P(BC) just called. The bluff raise makes things more complicated and different river cards on the same flop/turn board also affect ranges and play on the river, but that's where it starts getting complicated . 

So that's like intro to HU GTO play in NLHE. It gets wayyyyyy more complicated and the game is impossible to solve, especially for cash games which are usually played at least 100BB deep. As an example, I recently solved a turn spot I was curious about with a program I have written for solving these spots, and the decision tree I used had over 95k leaves(end points). It took my computer, which is probably more beast than 99% of people's on this forums around 2 days to solve, even with excellent optimization and recursion. 


That being said about GTO play, very very very few people actually strive to play GTO strats all the time, as GTO is only GTO if the other person is playing GTO, and while playing GTO will guarantee that you at least break even over time, the goal of poker is to make money, and you can play exploitative strategies that are more optimal against opponents tendencies making game theory OPTIMAL poker not OPTIMAL at all. Understanding GTO strategies however allows one to understand exploitative strategies at a much higher level. 

Sooo that's it! I will be happy to talk about the math behind calculating more complex situations if anyone is interested, but it will be another long post, lol.


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## XP12asdf (Jul 13, 2014)

Also, for anyone who knows practical economic game theory stuff please let me know, I would be interested in discussing it with you. Online poker is dying as games get tougher and tougher, and I've been interested in getting into the market, but I'm so busy with school, poker, and drinking right now that I haven't really had time to investigate economics much at all and anyone well versed in this who would be willing to push me in the right direction in terms of books or ideas or anything would be on my send a christmas card list or something.


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## baby blue me (May 9, 2014)

I am interested with game theory for logical thinking and decision making. I want to do away from my impulsive behaviour. It's helping a lot. 

Which theory/ies helped you?


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## Zamyatin (Jun 10, 2014)

Tezcatlipoca said:


> @RobynC
> 
> The idea is that cooperative networks will outcompete members who are solely benefitting themselves in time because the members who behave purely in their own interests will damage genetically related members for their own advantage which is a load that ideal cooperative networks don't have to deal with. Obviously there are no ideal cooperative networks, but the success and utility of this behavior can be seen in the evolution of ant mega colonies for example.
> 
> ...


Taking this reasoning to its fullest extent, sociopathy would not exist because the diminished returns for engaging in opportunistic antisocial behavior would over time cause the extinction of people with those traits. That's obviously not the case. I would suggest Robert Frank's book _Passions Within Reason_, which is one of the easiest to read books on how both cooperative and uncooperative behavior make sense and are expected outcomes of evolution. It's game theory, but written in laymen's language. Essentially, he argues that both types have an evolutionary niche (among many other things).


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## Tezcatlipoca (Jun 6, 2014)

Well, you are correct, however it is also the case that as resources tend to infinity people become more altruistic/cooperative because it is simply more advantageous. Remember most of our evolutionary history was spent scrounging for subsistence and beating each other to death in the forest. We have entered a human phase where we will have much more resources for the foreseeable future than our ancestors could have dreamt of and this trend will continue unless we use technology to wipe each other out. Under those conditions it is both necessary for survival and advantageous to evolve more cooperatively just like the ants. When I say abundance of resources I will give you a small example. In space a small 60 m asteroid has approx. $60 billion in rare earth metals. According to wiki "1.1 and 1.9 million asteroids larger than 1 km (0.6 mi) in diameter" are in the asteroid belt. So as a long term trend as we evolve for different habitats and terraforming planets in space we will have to become something we have never seen before that will be as incomprehensible to us as our present lifestyle would be to Australopithecus.

http://pnas.org/content/early/2013/08/28/1306246110

Part of the reasons mammals outcompete reptiles for example is care for the young which allows them more time/resources for developing intelligence.


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## noname42 (Mar 8, 2013)

st4rbrst said:


> Also, for anyone who knows practical economic game theory stuff please let me know, I would be interested in discussing it with you. Online poker is dying as games get tougher and tougher, and I've been interested in getting into the market, but I'm so busy with school, poker, and drinking right now that I haven't really had time to investigate economics much at all and anyone well versed in this who would be willing to push me in the right direction in terms of books or ideas or anything would be on my send a christmas card list or something.


The best way to explain game theory in economic terms is when there is an oligopoly, the market is controlled by a few producers, like the oil industry.

When game theory is applied, helps explain the quantity produced of such markets.

The end result is that its better for those few producers to cooperatively agree on a certain quantity to be produced in the long run. AKA, OPEC. Or else everybody will loose.


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## John Coltrane (May 11, 2013)

st4rbrst said:


> Also, for anyone who knows practical economic game theory stuff please let me know, I would be interested in discussing it with you. Online poker is dying as games get tougher and tougher, and I've been interested in getting into the market, but I'm so busy with school, poker, and drinking right now that I haven't really had time to investigate economics much at all and anyone well versed in this who would be willing to push me in the right direction in terms of books or ideas or anything would be on my send a christmas card list or something.


Here's *something*...the problems appear as optimization ones but tie in with the works of Nash so...

The choices available to individuals are affected by the choices that other people make. Feedback in a market economy is largely transmitted in prices, while in non-market economies the feedback is transmitted through the terms in which households are able to negotiate with one another. 

Mathematically, begin by imagining an economy of H households. The well-being of each household can be directly expressed by its aggregate consumption of goods & services, disregarding how consumption is spread amongst its individual members. Xh can denote the consumption vector in household h, whilst Jh is the set of potentially feasible vectors Xh, and Wh(Xh) is h's 'well-being'.

Within h's potentially feasible set Jh of consumption vectors lies the actual feasible set Fh. To model the feeback, we recognize that Fh depends on the consumptions of separate households. In other words, it is a function of the sequence (X1,...,Xh-1,Xh+1,...,XH). We may denote this sequence, which consists of every household's consumption vector except h's, by X-h. Formally, Fh is a function (or a 'correspondence') which takes objects of the form X-h to subsets of Jh. Household h's economic problem is to choose its consumption Xh from its feasbile set Fh(X-h) in such a way as to maximise its well-being Wh(Xh). The optimum choice is dependant on h's beliefs about X-h and the correspondence Fh(X-h).

In the meantime, all other households are making simular calculations, so how can the feedback be unraveled? One way is by studying states of affairs where the choices people make on the basis of their beliefs about the feedbacks are those which give rise to those very feedbacks...a state which can be called a social equilbrium. Formally, a sequence (X1*,...,XH*) of household choices is a social equilibrium if for every h, the choice Xh* of household h maximises its well-being Wh(Xh) over all choices of Xh in its feasible set Fh(X-h*).

The concept of a social equilibrium is transferable to that of a market equilbrium. Imagine a price vector P*(>=0) and a consumption vector Xh* for each household h, such that Xh* maximises Wh(Xh) subject to the budget constraint P*•(Xh-Mh) <=0 and such that the demands for goods and services across households are feasible (ie. ∑(Xh-Mh) <=0).


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## reptilian (Aug 5, 2014)

What would you guys define as game theory?


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## Pifanjr (Aug 19, 2014)

I recently finished the course Multi-Agent Learning, which focused on different parts of Game Theory.

If anyone is interested, there is a lot of material on the course website:
Multi-agent learning

Just go to the Time Table section. On the page of each lesson are a couple of papers, plus slides (and even some assignments)


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## elixare (Aug 26, 2010)

Game Theory is awesome - I use it all the time to explain/predict/control my competitors' movements so that I can outmaneuver them. I don't actually go around plotting tables/math equations or anything tho...that shit takes too much time/effort...I just incorporate the theory/principles in my reasoning in general to further boost the success rate of my actions....


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