# Deconstructing Jung With Heidegger



## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

Jungian psychology focuses on the division of the psyche into various conceptual categories. In this thread I wish to discuss what is arguably one of the most important divisions of the psyche that Jung makes popular: that division of the "objective factor" from the "subjective factor", which forms the basis of his distinction between "extraversion" (objective) and "introversion" (subjective), and thus forms the basis of distinction between each function attitude.

Jung himself used the conceptual tools he had available at the time to create his model of the psyche, and he chose to acknowledge the subject/object distinction that has for thousands of years pervaded Western intellectual traditions. We cannot fault Jung for this, but we do need to recognize how his own thinking was confused by this historical point of view, which has it's foundations in the Greeks, and has been taken for granted ever since by many of the greatest minds, including Descarte, and Aquinas.

The entire Western tradition of philosophy going all the way back to Platonic forms and Aristotle's formulation of the idea of _substance_, comes under critique by a man named Heidegger, who calls into the question the very notion of _being_ that has been taken for granted for thousands of years.

All throughout the history of Western thinking, there has been this powerful belief in the _presence_ of things, which we call their "being", or "existence". However, this is an erroneous mistake. We have come to confuse the _activity_ of being - the _event_ of existence - with _substance_. This mistaken way of thinking about being is the basis for distinctions between "minds" and "bodies", or "object" and "subject", or "essence" and "accident".

All of these distinctions dissolve into meaninglessness if, instead of assuming that the question "does X exist" is a matter of _presence_, we come to understand that it is a question of _action_. If we instead look at "being" and "existence" not as _states_, but as the _horizon of time_, then we can transcend meaningless distinctions such as "object vs subject" and "mind versus body". It then becomes apparent that there is simply _reality_ - there are no substances, only _events_ - and there is _no meaningful difference_ between objectivity and subjectivity.

By transcending the object/subject distinction, the introvert/extravert distinction becomes equally meaningless. There is simply _no real difference_ between an introvert and an extravert when it comes to whether or not this-or-that "factor" influences perception or judgment, because the entire distinction is based on a misunderstanding of what "being" is in the first place. Thus, we have to go _beyond Jung_ and ask what his distinction actually entails.

If instead we look at this distinction from the understanding of Heidegger's _Daesin_, then we must redefine the extraversion/introversion distinction, such that it cannot be based on the object/subject distinction, which is meaningless. Rather, the extravert/introvert distinction can be understood as an _activity_ which the psyche engages in. This activity, as I understand it now more clearly, is the very same activity that led Plato to formulate his concept of "forms", and Aristotle his concept of "substances" in the first place. The "extraversion/introversion" distinction is _happening_ in the psyche because of some _more fundamental activity_ that the psyche engages in, which produces this false distinction.

We must accept that the distinction itself is quite apparently _an illusion_ - and instead of endorsing it as a real distinction (as our psyche apparently wants us to do), we need to ask _why is the psyche doing this?_ By asking that question, we get to the bottom of the _one and only real "factor" at work behind both attitudes that produces the distinction in the first place._ In the end, there is only _one factor_ - and it is neither "objective" nor "subjective" - it is simply the activity of _being_, or _"Daesin"_.


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## aendern (Dec 28, 2013)

Dasein seems inherently subjective, introverted. Contemplative rather than engaging.

I don't understand where your logic is coming from, or what the point of this thread is.


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## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

emberfly said:


> Dasein seems inherently subjective, introverted. Contemplative rather than engaging.
> 
> I don't understand where your logic is coming from, or what the point of this thread is.


There is no such thing as "subjectivity". It is a meaningless distinction based on thousands of years of misunderstanding in the Western intellectual tradition.

My logic is coming from Heidegger's _Being and Time_.

The point of this thread is to ask, "what is the _one factor_ that is _really_ at work in the psyche that produces this meaningless distinction between "object" and 'subject"?"


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## Recede (Nov 23, 2011)

Abraxas said:


> All throughout the history of Western thinking, there has been this powerful belief in the _presence_ of things, which we call their "being", or "existence". However, this is an erroneous mistake. We have come to confuse the _activity_ of being - the _event_ of existence - with _substance_. This mistaken way of thinking about being is the basis for distinctions between "minds" and "bodies", or "object" and "subject", or "essence" and "accident".
> 
> All of these distinctions dissolve into meaninglessness if, instead of assuming that the question "does X exist" is a matter of _presence_, we come to understand that it is a question of _action_. If we instead look at "being" and "existence" not as _states_, but as the _horizon of time_, then we can transcend meaningless distinctions such as "object vs subject" and "mind versus body". It then becomes apparent that there is simply _reality_ - there are no substances, only _events_ - and there is _no meaningful difference_ between objectivity and subjectivity.


This needs explanation. Why is belief in presence erroneous? What does it mean for something to be a question of action? What is the horizon of time? Why are object and subject meaningless distinctions?


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## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

Silveresque said:


> Why is belief in presence erroneous?


Because the belief in substance is erroneous.



Silveresque said:


> What does it mean for something to be a question of action?


It means that being is time, not substance, and it is a question of an activity taking place, rather than objective/subjective 'existence'.



Silveresque said:


> What is the horizon of time?


An example of a temporal horizon would be "birth and death".



Silveresque said:


> Why are object and subject meaningless distinctions?


Because they are divisions of existence as if existence were made up of substances rather than events.


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## Recede (Nov 23, 2011)

Abraxas said:


> Because the belief in substance is erroneous.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


I'm getting the impression you're not interested in explaining anything. Not sure what you expect from this thread, then.


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## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

Silveresque said:


> I'm getting the impression you're not interested in explaining anything. Not sure what you expect from this thread, then.


I don't really know what you want here. Do you want me to give you the crash course on Heidegger and Wittgenstein or something? It's a complicated topic, probably not for beginners. I explained the gist of it already, but I'm not going to go into it because it's literally considered one of the most difficult philosophical texts ever written.

It's really meant as a discussion piece for anyone who has read Heidegger before and is informed enough to get the thrust of my OP and has something to say about it. If you don't get it, then don't worry about it.

That goes for anyone else reading along. If this stuff is gibberish to you, then don't worry about it. I specifically did not bother to provide all the arguments behind Heidegger's critique because I'm not interested in giving an hour long philosophy lecture as a primer just so I can build up to the post I wanted to make.


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## Psychopomp (Oct 3, 2012)

Abraxas said:


> Jungian psychology focuses on the division of the psyche into various conceptual categories. In this thread I wish to discuss what is arguably one of the most important divisions of the psyche that Jung makes popular: that division of the "objective factor" from the "subjective factor", which forms the basis of his distinction between "extraversion" (objective) and "introversion" (subjective), and thus forms the basis of distinction between each function attitude.
> 
> Jung himself used the conceptual tools he had available at the time to create his model of the psyche, and he chose to acknowledge the subject/object distinction that has for thousands of years pervaded Western intellectual traditions. We cannot fault Jung for this, but we do need to recognize how his own thinking was confused by this historical point of view, which has it's foundations in the Greeks, and has been taken for granted ever since by many of the greatest minds, including Descarte, and Aquinas.
> 
> ...


The problem is that while this might be very intriguing on an ontological level, it will ultimately have little bearing for us on the ground. That is to say, Descartes might speculate that nothing outside of his own sentience can be verified, but if you throw a phone at his head, and he doesn't duck, he is going to get harmed by the phone. He can then philosophize on this at length, while he is grabbing a bandage and an aspirin. 

Thus, I suppose my criticism of this is taking concepts (Subjectivity and Objectivity) that are here understood to exist on a very practical level, and elevating them to an ontological one is a categorical error. There may even be a concept of Objectivity and Subjectivity that exists, whole and complete, on that ontological plane that nevertheless has no bearing on what Jung, and we, mean by Objectivy and Subjectivity on the plane of human interactions. 

If you seek to 'trump' this with ontological conundrums, it nevertheless will not affect either the price of tea in China or the natural tendency in people to focus cognitively on either Objective or Subjective thoughts/feeling/sensations/intuitions. Again, I refer you to the phone cocked dangerously in my imaginary hand pointed intentedly at some philosopher's head. The facts remain.


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## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

arkigos said:


> The problem is that while this might be very intriguing on an ontological level, it will ultimately have little bearing for us on the ground. That is to say, Descartes might speculate that nothing outside of his own sentience can be verified, but if you throw a phone at his head, and he doesn't duck, he is going to get harmed by the phone. He can then philosophize on this at length, while he is grabbing a bandage and an aspirin.
> 
> Thus, I suppose my criticism of this is taking concepts (Subjectivity and Objectivity) that are here understood to exist on a very practical level, and elevating them to an ontological one is a categorical error. There may even be a concept of Objectivity and Subjectivity that exists, whole and complete, on that ontological plane that nevertheless has no bearing on what Jung, and we, mean by Objectivy and Subjectivity on the plane of human interactions.
> 
> If you seek to 'trump' this with ontological conundrums, it nevertheless will not affect either the price of tea in China or the natural tendency in people to focus cognitively on either Objective or Subjective thoughts/feeling/sensations/intuitions. Again, I refer you to the phone cocked dangerously in my imaginary hand pointed intentedly at some philosopher's head. The facts remain.


I understand what you're getting at. I completely agree, that this shouldn't become a discussion about the basis of ontological distinctions that have a function in language for practical purposes. My question is more existential, a matter of directedness of the psyche, not really a metaphysical critique. Heidegger's own critique was only meant to set the stage for his introduction of the concept of Daesin as the central focus of his work, which is more a question of "being" in the sense of doing something with your life.

So in that way, I'm questioning what "factor" in the psyche produces the will to "be" in the sense of finding one's existence meaningful.

I'll jump ahead a bit (I was hoping the discussion would've opened up to this eventually), and throw out what's on my mind. I think there is a more fundamental "factor" at play in the psyche that pushes for "directedness", which is actually a a fundamental psychic force producing all these divisions that Jung points out - divisions like Ego and Shadow, consciousness and unconsciousness, introversion and extraversion.

I think consciousness itself, as a psychological phenomena, and it's corresponding differentiated opposite, unconsciousness, are all part of this process of Daesin in the psyche, the process of "being", and that is really the one and only "factor" pushing the psyche to divide itself in various ways, but that ultimately, all of these divisions are like layers of an onion - they are meaningful for, as you put it, practical reasons, but if we're trying to get to the bottom of the rabbit hole, which is what I'm trying to do, then I think something else is going on at the root of the psyche that is more important and meaningful than a conceptual distinction.

All of these distinctions that we make are "practical", but only because of their very being. The deconstruction is that, if Daesin did not push for the psyche to divide itself into these various categories, then the psychology of our lives would be very different, because these distinctions wouldn't have any meaning to us.

I'm attempting to append that small addition, which may seem unimportant, but I don't think it really is. I think it's important to distinguish a more primordial factor, underlying the subjective and objective factor, which is "being" itself, as the real _origin_ of Jung's "psychic libido".


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## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

@arkigos

In the case of Descarte and the phone, what occurred has meaning - but it is completely meaningless to talk about "Descarte" and "phones" as objects rather than as events in time. Because it is the _event_ that has meaningfulness - indeed, the event happening in time that _is_ the phone, has meaning and quite literally is what we mean when we refer to the phone. And when you have the example of Descarte being hit by the phone, we're talking about an event, which is the whole point. That _event_ has meaning, and that event is itself an amalgam of other events, namely, the phone, Descarte, and so forth - but none of these events are _objects_ that exist in this-or-that way, either objectively or subjectively for instance.

I'm actually trying to argue that we need to stop wasting time making distinctions between objective and subjective events. Everything is simply an event, plain and simple. Usually when someone says a thing is subjective, what they are trying to differentiate is a matter of _imperative_ - i.e., that "subjective" events are not as _dire_ or something like that. But if that is what we mean by calling something subjective, then the question, "what is subjective?" is not a metaphysical question, it's a moral question, because nothing exists in a vacuum. Meaning is a matter of temporal context.

Applying that to Jung, then it renders his distinction between objective factors and subjective factors meaningless outside of a temporal context as well. Instead, everything is merely an event _happening_ and it is meaningless to credit "objects" or the "subject" with any kind of influence over perception or judgment - doing that is putting the cart before the horse. Rather, there is only one force at work, which is the factor of _meaningfulness_ that these events take on due to the complex narrative of natural history. It is far more practical to simply examine what the origin of meaning is, in the sense of a causal connection between a series of events, than it is to ask whether there is some "subjective factor" at work.

If we just stopped making these distinctions, then they would cease to exist completely, and we'd be left with a pure understanding of the psyche as merely a series of events taking place, rather than an artificial conception of the mind as an object possessing specific properties.


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## Ksara (Feb 13, 2014)

From what I make of this, is the essence of what you are arguing is that the mind is an event/happening/process rather than a thing/object (and the implications this leads to)?

I don't mean to reduce it down, but I'm just seeing the distinction of verb over noun.


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## Jewl (Feb 28, 2012)

@_Abraxas_, words get so limiting when discussing stuff like this. That's part of what makes it so hard to explain, I think. I tried to read Being and Time. Usually, I've had no problem reading and understanding things from other philosophers. This time I'd literally be staring at a sentence reading it over and over again trying to wrap my mind around a concept I could barely fathom. But that's partially why I like it. 

Anyways, you just became my favorite person for applying phenomenology to personality theory. 

Could you perhaps try and tell me what you mean by the distinction between the "event" of being and the substance of being? I read through your post three times trying to puzzle it out. 

I think despite only getting a bit of the essence of what you're saying (haha - wait, no, don't think about that too hard), the idea is extremely interesting.


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## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

Ksara said:


> From what I make of this, is the essence of what you are arguing is that the mind is an event/happening/process rather than a thing/object (and the implications this leads to)?
> 
> I don't mean to reduce it down, but I'm just seeing the distinction of verb over noun.


Essentially, yes.

The distinction is one that we make yes, and my argument is that it is purely conceptual and arises out of misconception about events. Events take on the appearance of substance by way of repetition, and so we imagine conceptual "objects" that are purely conceptual. Because certain events repeat in a predictable/reliable pattern, we come up with "nouns" in order to designate them. But deconstructing the essence of what a noun really is, I would argue that all nouns are derived from verbs, in the sense that if I use a noun like "banana" in a sentence, if I am talking about a banana that really exists and is not a pure conception, then that banana is an event in time, and thus it is a causal activity - a verb. But if instead I am not referring to any _particular_ banana, but just the _concept of_ "a banana", then I am using a noun and only referring to something _a priori_.

Therefore, while I speak a language with a verb-noun distinction, I understand that this distinction is purely conceptual and does not exist in reality. It is something that the mind does, which is itself an event in time, like everything else. I can, if I wish to, simply perceive reality as _pure causation_, cause and effect, and perceive objects simply as events, recognizing that objects are merely the _a priori_ intangible concepts of events that exist due to a mental event, namely the activity of _thinking_.

Jung even defines thinking this way, saying in his Tavistock Lectures on Analytical Psychology that, "sensation tells us merely that a thing exists, while thinking tells us _what_ a thing is, feeling tells us what it is _worth_, and intuition tells us where it is going and from whence it came."

Source: http://www.amazon.com/Analytical-Psychology-Practice-Tavistock-Lectures/dp/0394708628




Julia Bell said:


> @_Abraxas_, words get so limiting when discussing stuff like this. That's part of what makes it so hard to explain, I think. I tried to read Being and Time. Usually, I've had no problem reading and understanding things from other philosophers. This time I'd literally be staring at a sentence reading it over and over again trying to wrap my mind around a concept I could barely fathom. But that's partially why I like it.
> 
> Anyways, you just became my favorite person for applying phenomenology to personality theory.
> 
> ...


I think my reply to Ksara may have helped to clarify what I mean when I make a distinction between substance and event. I see the one - events - as having a "real" quality to them in that they are _pure_ expressions of being in an empirical sense, whereas substances (objects) are merely conceptualizations of our experience of events. What has happened, as I see it, is that we assume the concept is the reality - that the object is the reality - rather than the event itself that defines the meaning of the object. We tend to ignore the importance of the horizon of time, and the _impermanence_ of "things".

I assume this is necessarily a psychological habit, and thus it must arise out of some psychic factor. I believe it is this factor, which I'll go ahead and call the "daesin factor" (daesin means "presence" in German, or "existence" in English), which is the really _primordial_ factor at work in the psyche which is ultimately responsible for the psyche's division of reality into these various categories. Objective and subjective distinctions, as well as the distinction between objects and events, are all produced by this factor _causing_ the psyche to divide reality up in these different ways so that the world we live in becomes _meaningful to us_, you see?

It is a very powerful existential argument I am making, that the essence of meaningfulness itself arises out of this "daesin factor", without which the psyche would be very different. We would, in effect, practically be robots, without any kind of _freedom_ or _identity_, because our lives would be utterly meaningless. But we _cannot_ live that way, because the psyche itself won't allow it. We have every freedom except one - that we _must_ be free. We can deceive ourselves into believing that we are not free, what Jean Paul Sarte calls "bad faith", but it amounts to nothing more than a mere deception in the end.

Naturally, ideas like these tend not to gain much traction outside of continental philosophy, because as you pointed out, they are phenomenological, rather than empirical, and thus do not fall into the realm of a scientific kind of validity. And so most people simply see no point in making these kinds of distinctions, but I do, and the point is this: I believe that most people, at some point in their lives, become intensely aware of a need for their lives to have _meaning_, and this need for meaning is really the fundamental psychological force at work behind every kind of judgment - thinking and feeling together - because both "what" a thing is, and what a thing is "worth" are fundamentally a matter of meaningfulness, which is an existential question.

We are too caught up in institutionalized ways of thinking to consider this need for meaningfulness a higher calling to a nobler purpose than the mere categorization of experience into "objective" taxonomies that are nothing more than an attempt at a merely tautological description of the world in which we live. In our struggle to survive and compete with each other, we have lost sight of what it means to live. We are so focused on the practical that we no longer have any ideals. Our intellectual goals are rigid and self-repetitive without any _spirit_ in them beyond maintaining the authority of the institutions they create, and the result of this is Nietzsche's nihilism, which is also the reactionary force behind every kind of "post-modern" and "deconstructive" movement that have become so popular these days. All of it arises out of the feeling of meaninglessness that is engendered by our mere adherence to intellectual traditions that are themselves, rooted in ancient misunderstandings made by some of the greatest minds in history.


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## aliceinbrc (Sep 10, 2012)

Fabulous thread.

I am drawn to deconstruction in other contexts, and I've wondered before about its suitability within the Jungian typology paradigm. I've long distrusted the subjective-objective construct because ideal objectivity is obviously unobtainable. Any analytic conceit will, by design and application, reflect "subjective" assumptions. Thus, what we really have is subjectivity we accept and subjectivity we reject by reshaping it into an ersatz "ideal" form.

I've played with deconstruction most when looking at gender and sexuality, which I think has difficulties similar to the Jungian cognitive scheme when it comes to establishing workable distinctions where "subjective" and "objective" realms exist. Have you read any Judith Butler? Her ideas re: gender are fascinating, and I see applicability to your thesis here.


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## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

aliceinbrc said:


> Fabulous thread.
> 
> I am drawn to deconstruction in other contexts, and I've wondered before about its suitability within the Jungian typology paradigm. I've long distrusted the subjective-objective construct because ideal objectivity is obviously unobtainable. Any analytic conceit will, by design and application, reflect "subjective" assumptions. Thus, what we really have is subjectivity we accept and subjectivity we reject by reshaping it into an ersatz "ideal" form.
> 
> I've played with deconstruction most when looking at gender and sexuality, which I think has difficulties similar to the Jungian cognitive scheme when it comes to establishing workable distinctions where "subjective" and "objective" realms exist. Have you read any Judith Butler? Her ideas re: gender are fascinating, and I see applicability to your thesis here.



Thank you!

No, I have not read Judith Butler, but I will look into her work. Is there a book you can recommend I start with? The topic of gender definition is actually of particular personal interest to me in my life.


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## aliceinbrc (Sep 10, 2012)

Abraxas said:


> Thank you!
> 
> No, I have not read Judith Butler, but I will look into her work. Is there a book you can recommend I start with? The topic of gender definition is actually of particular personal interest to me in my life.


So, "Gender Trouble" is what made her famous (as scholar go haha). It is a pretty seminal book on gender deconstruction--examining it as a cultural "performance." (Perhaps "seminal" is a dubious word choice for a radical female queer theorist ... ). She also wrote "Undoing Gender" which is incredible. She is _sometimes_ criticized by trans* political activists because her analysis devalues the subjective perception of one's own gender. Sounds like Fi and Ti not playing well together, but ... just so you know.

If you do get a chance to read either of these books, I'd love to chat with you about it. It's a fascinating topic.


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## Ksara (Feb 13, 2014)

Abraxas said:


> Essentially, yes.
> 
> The distinction is one that we make yes, and my argument is that it is purely conceptual and arises out of misconception about events. Events take on the appearance of substance by way of repetition, and so we imagine conceptual "objects" that are purely conceptual. Because certain events repeat in a predictable/reliable pattern, we come up with "nouns" in order to designate them. But deconstructing the essence of what a noun really is, I would argue that all nouns are derived from verbs, in the sense that if I use a noun like "banana" in a sentence, if I am talking about a banana that really exists and is not a pure conception, then that banana is an event in time, and thus it is a causal activity - a verb. But if instead I am not referring to any _particular_ banana, but just the _concept of_ "a banana", then I am using a noun and only referring to something _a priori_.
> 
> ...


Ok I think I get where you are going here.

The idea that what has happened, and what will happen, is/already has happened, but our mind only perceives one point along this line in time. We are not a thing that interacts with things, rather a point moving through time (essentially an event). When an event occurs often enough we tend to label it, and perhaps define it, as you said this is thinking.

I am curious, the idea of labling something to describe _what it is_. I get there is a tendency to view it as an object, but _is_ comes from _to be_ and that is a verb. To say that is, or I am, in essence is describing the current event unfolding. It becomes mistaken as an object because of an event that is reoccurring?

The banana was a interesting example, to me it parallels the idea of society. To many it appears as a thing, and object, as set of defined rules and hierarchy that exist. Even though intangible, people view it as an object. I think this arises from seeing it in the now, seeing it's current state and concluding this is what it is, how it has been and will always be.

The reality is one of a dynamic system or process that is forever changing. There is no absolute object rather a process or event that is constantly changing, even if these changes occurs slowly across generations. The way society is today is was different yesterday and will be different tomorrow.

I don't know if I have expressed my understanding correctly, I can see what you are saying but it is difficult to put into words.



What I find interesting is that a lot of what we do see is not reality, but laced with our memories and ideas. It's too much information for the brain to bring everything we see into consciousness. So in essensence what we do perceive is not what actually exists. We do not see the world around us, we see our idea of the world around us.
(And this is when I question why I see the reality I do? can I change my perception to view it completely differently?)


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## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

@_Ksara_

Exactly. And that's why I asserted that daesin could be understood in the context of Jung's psychology as a primordial factor in the psyche, which causes the psyche to divide itself into conscious and unconscious realms, and thus provides a context for object/subject distinctions, as well as mind/body, and every other dichotomy conceivable. As I responded to @_FearAndTrembling_ in another thread, "in the absence of ignorance, knowledge has no meaning."

From a pragmatic perspective, @_arkigos_ and the others are correct in pointing out that it "does not change the price of tea in china" - but what it does do is change _us_ in a fundamental way. It changes how we think about tea, in that it gives us a more precise and better understanding of what tea really is.

By recognizing that reality is not static, but rather that it is eternally _dynamic_, and realizing that things (objects) only take on objective meaning by virtue of being temporal _events_, everything gets placed into a historical _context_. It is only within that context that "things" have any meaning, otherwise there would be no objects as conceptual points of reference in the first place. In fact, you can even apply this to the objective idea of "truth" itself by saying that, truth is not the conformity of thoughts with things ("veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei"), rather, _truth is the daughter of time_ ("veritas temporis filia").

I can give another example with the objective idea of insanity (insanity is an objective idea, in the sense that it is socially defined, as you'll see in a moment).

Today, a man with schizophrenia has a serious "disorder" and he receives treatment or suffers in society because his state of mind is a "dysfunction." It is a dysfunction because it interferes with what he's expected to do - get a job, find love, get married, pay his taxes, and so forth. He's unhappy because he can't do any of those things very easily. Most places won't hire him, most girls think he's weird, so he probably won't get married, and he forgets to do important things like pay his taxes because he's often "delusional" and he can't focus on "important" things.

Go back a thousand years.

Now this man is a shaman. He is gifted and he receives the respect and protection of the tribe, because he plays an important social role. His gift empowers him to perform his task, which is to communicate with spirits, or whatever else he must do. He is happy, because he doesn't have to worry about finding a wife, work, or worry about taxes. He can just focus on what matters to him and live a complete life, and when he dies people respect his memory and nobody would say that he was sick or unwise because there is a context for his state of mind.

You can even just look at yourself. Are you merely what you are right now, objectively, physically, standing in front of the mirror? Or is "Ksara", in fact, an event _happening_ in time, caught up in a complex system of other events that make up the very thing called _causation_?

That is how "objects" are really transitive and only take on their reality due to temporal context, because they are actually just events - events that have a certain kind of _inertia_. Some events, like the sun, are so old and prolonged that we're justified in just referring to them as objects because it is practical to do so. In that way, we don't have to do away with the object/event distinction, or stop using nouns and only use verbs, because the distinction is practical. It's only something to be aware of as an exercise to keep yourself sharp, because it puts everything into a proper context instead of being taken for granted.


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## reptilian (Aug 5, 2014)

@Abraxas
I think Lacan's view from Kant will answer your questions.


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## redneck15 (Mar 21, 2011)

Abraxas said:


> Essentially, yes.
> 
> The distinction is one that we make yes, and my argument is that it is purely conceptual and arises out of misconception about events. Events take on the appearance of substance by way of repetition, and so we imagine conceptual "objects" that are purely conceptual. Because certain events repeat in a predictable/reliable pattern, we come up with "nouns" in order to designate them. But deconstructing the essence of what a noun really is, I would argue that all nouns are derived from verbs, in the sense that if I use a noun like "banana" in a sentence, if I am talking about a banana that really exists and is not a pure conception, then that banana is an event in time, and thus it is a causal activity - a verb. But if instead I am not referring to any _particular_ banana, but just the _concept of_ "a banana", then I am using a noun and only referring to something _a priori_.
> 
> ...


I have an instinct that _Daesin_ is not a coherent concept. It's more of a marker to indicate something we don't understand, that is likely a composite. 



Abraxas said:


> We are too caught up in institutionalized ways of thinking to consider this need for meaningfulness a higher calling to a nobler purpose than the mere categorization of experience into "objective" taxonomies that are nothing more than an attempt at a merely tautological description of the world in which we live. In our struggle to survive and compete with each other, we have lost sight of what it means to live. We are so focused on the practical that we no longer have any ideals. Our intellectual goals are rigid and self-repetitive without any _spirit_ in them beyond maintaining the authority of the institutions they create, and the result of this is Nietzsche's nihilism, which is also the reactionary force behind every kind of "post-modern" and "deconstructive" movement that have become so popular these days. All of it arises out of the feeling of meaninglessness that is engendered by our mere adherence to intellectual traditions that are themselves, rooted in ancient misunderstandings made by some of the greatest minds in history.


Here I disagree. I don't think you can call the object/subject distinction an error so much as a useful tool. It is only an error if you don't recognize it is a composite.

The same can be said of events; what is an event? Can you distinguish between one event and another for me? Event is another construct, a set of brackets humans set on some aspect of reality that they have perceived. Yet calling events an illusion is a mistake; they are not an illusion, but a necessary step in incepting reality coherently.

I think the attempt to point out that these concepts are composite constructs that can be deconstructed to more basic concepts is a good thing. But equally it would be a mistake to think that reverse engineering our terms will yield new revelations. It can only show us the steps we've taken in the past. 

Philosophy should not stand alone in this. For example, someone with linguistic fluency could tell us what kind of corresponding constructs for subject/object and event exist in other languages. From this perhaps we could learn what other solutions have been come up with. Or perhaps if there is no other, it would tell us that the human mind has some predisposition for building these concepts. 

Biology as well has something to say about _Daesin_. I am completing a degree in that field myself, but I would not say that empirical research only has a place in understanding the mind. Philosophy provides the 'mental space' for understanding and perhaps guiding the direction of research. Why not work the candle at both ends?

What makes philosophy weak is the lack of facts to work with. This allows misinterpretation and unproved assertions to flourish. For example, you say we are filled with meaninglessness, our intellectual categories are sterile, we are focused on the practical without ideals, and that Nietzsche's nihilism has emerged across society because of this. 

What does that even mean? You're getting at something, but what it is I can't say. It could be a passing mood of intellectuals, it could be that humans are designed to function in family groups and they get depressed when they are made to live in artificial arrangements, it could be that a certain segment of the population is inclined to be nihilistic and they overexaggerate that this affects us all. 

But without some kind of empirical foundation, I don't think you can draw conclusions like that. They are interesting ideas, but not precise enough for us to build on them with confidence.


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## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

@_BlackCoffee_

On events versus objects: yes as you say, events and objects are just two sides of the same coin. But there is an emphasis on one side of the coin, and so people undervalue the other side, which deserves it's own due emphasis, which I'm giving it now. To be perfectly fair, you are right. Ultimately, it is not important whether we view the world as events or objects because the two are mirror images of each other - space and time are, fundamentally, the same thing: Spacetime. However, we live in a historical period where one perspective gets neglected and the other is considered supreme - that the features of objects are the basis for truth and to view truth as existing only in a temporal context as an amalgam of events is to argue that truth is "subjective" and therefore invalid. Again, ultimately that is correct - neither perspective is superior to the other. They are, in fact, the same perspective, but from different points of view.

Actually, I suppose you might say, in that sense, that it doesn't really matter. So, in retrospect, you have kind of inspired me to reconsider my position. Perhaps it actually doesn't matter what perspective we assume, empirical or not, it produces the same result in the end. As long as we all just agree to adhere to the same perspective, then all confusion is eliminated and we can just proceed to watch things play out. Intuitively, I grasp that might be the case, so I withdraw my argument for the supremacy of events over objects. I see now that is mistaken. Perhaps it is due to an imbalance in my own psyche, favoring one perspective over the other arbitrarily.

On empiricism: As I stated in the response that you just quoted, my argument is not based on empiricism, it is phenomenological. Existential questions do not always need to be justified with empirical arguments, they can be answered with intuition and/or innate knowledge. Because you do not seem to consider intuition and introspection a valid source of information, you "can't say" what I'm getting at. For you it must come back to the natural world, something grounded in the _a posteriori_ realm of knowing, but for me, I would argue that there are some truths that are _built into the psyche_ which can be grasped intuitively and do not require an empirical explanation.

Perhaps a useful analogy here is to say, an empiricist tries to convince someone of what is happening on Mars because he has a very powerful and very accurate telescope he can use to observe it's surface. Anyone who had access to such a thing could see it as well, but most people don't, so they don't agree with him. Who is to say if he's right or not? In the same way, I am employing a very powerful and very accurate _logic_ to examine the features of the psyche in order to make determinations about it, and most people probably haven't built telescopes to look at Mars, so I have created a thread to give them a chance to come and take a look. Not everyone will see, and so it can't be helped. I might be wrong, or I might be right. The problem is a lack of consensus because the material we're dealing with is very advanced stuff, and when it comes to introspection, there's not a clear standard besides logical validity.

On philosophy versus science: Yes, that is true. I agree that it is best to approach the issue from "both sides". My argument so far is an existential one, and coming at it from an ontological point of view. I am proposing that the Jungian model points in the direction of a primordial factor that represents the fundamental function of the psyche itself - the division of reality into conceptual categories that give meaning to our experiences by contrasting them against each other to provide some sort of context for our lives, but that ultimately, there is no real context for anything. Everything simply _exists_ and has no _innate_ meaning. The psyche generates this meaning, which is it's only essential purpose, out of which every other feature of our existence is derived.

I can't falsify this empirically, but there are many things that can't be falsified empirically, yet are still important features of our lives. For instance, I can't falsify the square of 2 because it is irrational, but I can be certain beyond practical doubt that 2 is a square number. I can't measure the circumference of a circle to the nth degree, but I can be certain there are circles - I can't falsify that claim, but it seems reasonable enough that few would argue against it unless they were extreme skeptics or something. And although I'm not a linguist, there are certain features of language, such as certain words that are called "primitives", that we all take for granted, but the causal origin of which is still pretty much a mystery.

But you've made your point, and I agree, it would be arbitrary to say that they _shouldn't even attempt_ an empirical description. I concede that it is just a bias in my way of thinking, that I tend to prefer an intuitive _a priori_ approach over an empirical one.

Also, on Daesin: you are correct. Heidegger himself stated that Daesin cannot be comprehended, it is merely a concept that stands as a marker, as you put it. That's essentially the same way he presents the concept. He holds that total "non-being" or "no-thing" is paradoxically the origin of Daesin, which is "something out of nothing" (the word Daesin stands for "presence" in german). So, yes, it is an incoherent concept in that sense, because it cannot be fully grasped, it can only be understood intuitively, much like certain forms of geometry.


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## AdInfinitum (Oct 21, 2014)

In the grand scheme of issues, subjective and objective are represented through the same clause, same ideal, same worldly immersion into the existential core. Did not Heidegger try to summarize the clause of being as encompassing all the subjects/objects into one state and identity through the time/space dimension? And we could also claim that putting a definition as rigid subjective/objective to the way the world is interpreted and the way the human mind seeks its own understanding devalues every potential stacked as undefinable however intuited. I sometimes feel as if the human limited itself other than expanding through definitions and strict concepts on its own connections.


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## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

jkp said:


> @_Abraxas_
> I think Lacan's view from Kant will answer your questions.


Thank you, I had not heard of Jacques Lacan before. I'll look into it.


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## redneck15 (Mar 21, 2011)

Abraxas said:


> On empiricism: As I stated in the response that you just quoted, my argument is not based on empiricism, it is phenomenological. Existential questions do not always need to be justified with empirical arguments, they can be answered with intuition and/or innate knowledge. Because you do not seem to consider intuition and introspection a valid source of information, you "can't say" what I'm getting at. For you it must come back to the natural world, something grounded in the _a posteriori_ realm of knowing, but for me, I would argue that there are some truths that are _built into the psyche_ which can be grasped intuitively and do not require an empirical explanation.


I think it's foolish to _denigrate_ intuition and introspection, but _dangerous_ to call them a source of knowledge. I would say that they are a form of conjecture. I think it's even possible that a large portion of really new and creative advances come from them. You can also use logic to systematize them, and build a castle in the air with them. But they are like movies or fantasy fiction in this respect; they present a picture of things that may or may not correspond to something external.

As for truths built into the psyche, it is possible, but if so there is no clear way of knowing in a given case what is going on. My experience with internal knowledge involves high Ni usage in my early and mid teens. My recollection of that is that much of the internal landscape was a symbolic representation of the external environment. At that time I recognized this, so I can't say if a more unconscious process would not have produced more original content. 

Today my external environment is very different, and the contents of my Ni are also very different. As an extrovert, I also experienced a lot of happiness in abandoning what felt to me like the stifling stagnation of internal imagery in favor of completely new prospects. That is my own bias 



Abraxas said:


> Also, on Daesin: you are correct. Heidegger himself stated that Daesin cannot be comprehended, it is merely a concept that stands as a marker, as you put it. That's essentially the same way he presents the concept. He holds that total "non-being" or "no-thing" is paradoxically the origin of Daesin, which is "something out of nothing" (the word Daesin stands for "presence" in german). So, yes, it is an incoherent concept in that sense, because it cannot be fully grasped, it can only be understood intuitively, much like certain forms of geometry.


Glad that I grasped _Daesin_, then, at least the core of the idea. It's intriguing, don't get me wrong, but a little voice asks me "But what is this leading to? What can I use this for?" And at first I didn't think of a use, so I decided to criticize the refining of concepts. But after reflection, I realize that _Daesin _is close enough to something I've been trying to grasp for a long time, so there's one to philosophy! I assumed it was generated by activity, but now I wonder if that isn't too simplistic.


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## Abraxas (May 28, 2011)

BlackCoffee said:


> I think it's foolish to _denigrate_ intuition and introspection, but _dangerous_ to call them a source of knowledge. I would say that they are a form of conjecture. I think it's even possible that a large portion of really new and creative advances come from them. You can also use logic to systematize them, and build a castle in the air with them. But they are like movies or fantasy fiction in this respect; they present a picture of things that may or may not correspond to something external.


As I stated, you are making an empiricist argument here because you are asserting that sense experience is the only acceptable basis and is, one way or another, the only origin of knowledge - that reason must be coupled with sense experience or else it is "conjecture" as you put it, and it has no meaning because it is "fantasy fiction". That is the definition of empiricism: knowledge only has meaning in relation to sense experience.

Rationalism is it's opponent: that reason, and _reason alone_ is sufficient for claims of knowledge, and sense experience is not. I started this discussion from an essentially rationalist point of view, and I restated that position in my last reply to you, that I would argue the opposite - that reason alone is the basis of knowledge, and certain claims of knowledge do not require proof derived from sense experience, such as intuitive/introspective claims, or claims based on foundational ideas (such as geometry). I am of the opinion that these kinds of knowledge (_a priori facts_) can be and are meaningful _independent_ of sense experience, and do not need to be falsified or applied to the natural world to have intrinsic value in our lives.

Not all things must have *extrinsic value*. Some things can be *intrinsically valuable.*

As a rationalist, the most ground I am willing to give here is to concede that empiricism has its place, as a basis for the study of the natural world that makes up our shared sense experience, but that's it. When someone like you goes so far as to reject the natural faculties of the mind, such as intuition and reflection, as only having meaning in relation to sense experience, then you are over-applying empiricism and the discussion can not progress any farther. Not everything must be brought to mean something in relation to sense experience. Some things are meaningful _a priori_ and form the basis of knowledge _independent_ of our sense experience.

I think at this point the two discussions we've had so far keep circling around to this same thing. Before, in the INTJ sub-forum, it was on values, and now this, which is essentially the same argument all over again. I predicted it then, and here we are now, again going over it. So, I'll say it again: this is an intellectual battle between extraversion and introversion, plain and simple. It is Ti vs Te. I cannot see a resolution to this disagreement, unless you plan to resolve the epistemological disagreement between empiricism and rationalism in this very thread.

To quote from Jung:

This difference is perceived most clearly when extraverted thinking is engaged upon material, which is specifically an object of the subjectively orientated thinking. This happens, for instance, when a subjective conviction is interpreted analytically from objective facts or is regarded as a product or derivative of objective ideas. But, for our 'scientifically' orientated consciousness, the difference between the two modes of thinking becomes still more obvious when the subjectively orientated thinking makes an attempt to bring objective data into connections not objectively given, i.e. to subordinate them to a subjective idea. Either senses the other as an encroachment, and hence a sort of shadow effect is produced, wherein either type reveals to the other its least favourable aspect, The subjectively orientated thinking then appears quite arbitrary, while the extraverted thinking seems to have an incommensurability that is altogether dull and banal. Thus the two standpoints are incessantly at war.


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